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By
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Conversation Or InteIlectual Imperialism
in Comparing Communication (Theories)
by Kl aus Krippendorff
The Annenberg School for Communication
University of Pennsylvania
Abstract
A proposal for a recursive understanding of

Understanding

Comrnunication

Practice

上 ν

-L

Perturbations (noise) enter a process
from its embodyment or the movement
to a subordinate order of recursion

The unfolding of understanding into

(

its embodym~nt in pr~ctic~ or mo~ing
to a superordinate order of recursion

Two constructions A and B interacting or
comparing the~elves ~r: t~e medi~m
of th-eir embodymen t. Understanding
and practice exemplify such constructions

and what happens if understanding does not enter comparisons of human communication
(theories ).
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1 am responding to the two Forum arti c1es on "comparative theory" in
Communication Theory 1. 1.
To begin, let me say that 1 have always gained new insights from being
communicatively involved with unusual people and groups or by experiencing
cultures different from my own. It can broaden one’ s horizon and relativise one ’s
own perspectives. 1 am therefore intrigued by proposals to emich communication
theories through the systematic application of appropriate comparative
methodologies. But, 1 am also worried, and this paper is largely motivated by the
fear , that the epistemological assumptions built into the language used for such
comparisons may frustrate

thεse

promises and fuel instead an intellectual

imperialism which consists in privileging human communication theories that deny
those theorized therein the ability to construct, understand, and communicate
theories of their own. Such theories can bring forth cognitively disabling
technologies and unwittingly institute instruments of oppression that are all the
more persuasive as nobody seems to assume responsibilities for them.
Clearly, the appropriateness of any comparative methodology is intricately
linked to the nature of the objects being compared , here to theories and practices of
human communication, which invariably entail conceptions of human participation.
1 agree with Brenda Dervin when she writes "that we have failed to develop
powerful approaches to comparative theory and this failure …(lies) in the very
nature of the analytic we are now using" and "how we conceptualize ... the
communicating human" (1991:60-61).

Hεr

paper seeks to affect a shift from

comparing entities to comparing processes. 1 hope to take the idea of a comparative
methodology one step further by proposing a discourse based method , a grammar or
an epistemological framework not only for the twin problem of constructing
communication theories comparatively and of making appropriate comparisons
among them communicable , but also for enabling human participation at the same
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time. 1 shall do this in the form of several propositions that 1 hope will avoid the
intellectual imperialism feared. To be honest, by working through these
propositions one by one, 1 myself am surprised about the conclusions to which they
led. It could mean the need for a radical reformulation of our communication
theoretical and comparative efforts, including some of my OWll. Wh ether they are
true or not, if they stimulate conversation about communication (theory), then they
will have proven themselves viable in their very own terms.
One
To begin with , the common meaning of "comparison," "com" = together and
’ψar"

=equal would rendεr "comparison" =an act of sorting out likenesses (and by

implication differences) among objects brought together or this purpose. Consistent
with this etymology, and speaking about social systems as the objects of his concern,
Majid Tehranian suggests in his papεr that comparative theory be based on three
prenus
common to all systems, and (c) that the uniqueness of any social system can best be
appreciated by comparing it with what it has in common with others" (1991 :44).
Th is description invokes the image of overlapping sets of features , like in a Venn-

diagram, with the additional requirement that the conjunction of all sets must not be
empty. Th is superficially innocent conceptualization, which rules out that social
systems could be related to each other by Wittgensteinian family resemblances, is
common indeed. Wh at 1 wish to point out here is the objectivist presuppositions
built into these prernises as stated and practiced. Th e features , found to be either
unique or shared, are said to be features of the objects (systems) being compared and
these features as well as the objects that possess them reside entireψ outside of their
observers or exist independent of them. In fact , the observer making the comparison

( enacting the proposed comparative theory) is nowhere recognized in these features

3

To overcorne the objectivist view expressed in the above prernises let rne
suggst rny first proposition
Commonalties and differences arise in an observer’ s Ianguage.
Indeed , all cornparisons presurne a conceptual systern or a space into which various
objects can be placed. There is nothing "objective" about such a space. Spaces
always are an observer’ s construction and it is within such inventions that objects

acquire cornrnonalties and differences that are of interest to that obseπer or her
cornrnunity of peers. Thus , cornparisons take place in sorneone ’s understanding and
rnanifest thernselves in her lan밍lage. An 0비 ective

"re떠ity"

knows neither

sirnilarities nor differences.
I believe creating a suitable language for particular cornparisons is precisely
what Tehranian does , albeit unwittingly, for exarnple, when he constructs a rnatrÏx
out of two rather abstract variables, one consisting of four "cornrnunication and
control continuities and discontinuities" and the other of three kinds of "social
processes ," whose cells enable hirn to distinguish various cornrnunication theories ,
or, when he proposes a two-dirnensional space (surface) for cornparing

(literalψ

in

terrns of the orthogonal coordinates invented for this purpose) different
developrnent policies. To bε clear, what bothers rne is not the unquestionably
illurninating terrns chosen for these cornparisons but the implicit clairn that they
have nothing to do with the authors' own conceptions and interests in bringing forth
both the objects being cornpared and the results of these comparisons. Maybe, in
trying to avoid "ethnocentrisrn" (1991:45) , Tehranian seerns to go overboard towards
an objectivisrn that paints invariant features on the objects being cornpared and
conveniently projεcts the scientist’ s responsibilities for these features on their
presurned "nature." My first proposition suggests, it is not the 。이iects that are same or
di￦'rent

by themselves, it is the language used by someone that makes them so and this

4

someone cannot be relieved o[ the responsibility o[ having constructed them

αs

such.

Moreover, and 1 rnight add what 1 will address below, sarneness and difference are
not the only products of cornparisons.
T\1\'0

In general, 1 do not wish to decide for others what cornrnunication is or ought
to be, what distinguishes a systern that εrnbodies cornrnunication frorn one that does
not, etc. , for this would settle in an a priori rnanner what we wish to understand
through cornparisons of different observations of it. To express this attitude, let rne
sirnply s0':
Everything said is communicated to someone understanding it as such.
With this second proposition, 1 arn neither suggesting that all cornrnunication
involves a language (one obviously can say sornething in pictures and cornrnunicate
by touch). Nor that cornrnunication can only be with sorneone other than oneself
(notes taken and reread by sorneone can be seen as cornrnunications to one’s later
sel f), not even that a listener rnust be accurate in assessing a speaker’ s intentions. 1
arn sure , everyone who has travelled abroad will have
stranger who seerns to have no

cluε

e)φerienced

talking to a

as to what one says but clearly understands that

one wants to cornrnunicate sornething. 1 arn rnerely suggesting here that the εvent of
sornething being said, rnust be understood by someone (even if it is only the speaker
hersel f) as being said else nothing is said for anyone, and that the one who
understands it as such thereby constructs her own participation in a process of
cornrnunication, whatever this construction rnay be.
In the above, 1 use "said" or "saying sornething" as a rnetaphor of all kinds of
hurnan practices.

까lere

is not just linguistic but also non-linguistic behavior. Th ere
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is not just speaking but also writing, designing all kinds of artifacts , etc. Al l of these
are here considered practices.
Also , 1 seem to be using understanding and constructions interchangeably,

but 1 do wish to emphasize with them two different aspects of cognition. To me ,
understanding implies the feeling of being in touch with one ’s world, the confidence
that one’ s cog띠tive constructions are

affordζd

by it, work alright or fit one’s

practices. In contrast, construction emphasises the created or invented nature of
cognition in a particular experiential domain. Constructions can become manifest
in language and the consequences of their practice can contribute to understanding.
Moreover, the proposition considers untenable any claim insinuating that
saying, conveying, communicating or even doing something could bypass human
understanding. It follows that there can be no text, no discourse , no language and in
fact no-thing without someone recognizing it as such. In a way, the proposition turns
Watzlawick et al ’ s first axion of communication "one cannot not communicate"
(1967 :4 9) around by shifting the position taken from that of an author and
instrumental actor to that of a listener and

sεlf-declared

participant in the process

Indeed, one never can communicate with someone who fails or refuses to
understand what one says or does as communication. Th e observer’ s conceptions
are decisive here
To me, understanding and practice form an irreducible circular unity , a reality
that resides neither entirely in someone’ s head, as solipsists hold true , nor entirely
outside of 따

obseπer，

as objectivists claim it to

bε，

but in the dynamic fit between

them. We always act (or better see us acting) in our own understanding and we seek
understanding when something does not seem to work out in practice, leaving
everything outside the circular unity to the unknown. Even the distinction between
understanding and practice is drawn in our (my) understanding.
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Accordingly, it is not only impossible to speak about our own practice
without understanding it as such, we also are constitutionally prevented direct access
to someone else’s understanding. Understanding someone else’s understanding is
explaining what that someone says or does , her practice, in ways coherent with our
own understanding. Thus , the claim of understanding someone embraces her
practice and our construction of how she conceives what and while she is practicing
what we thereby explain. Understanding and practice establish two complementary
perspectives and assign different responsibilities for the observations on others.
Understanding our own or someone else’ s understanding embeds
understanding in itself and makes understanding a recursiveψ self-embedding

phenomenon. This is not the

casε

for practice. Th e recursion does not stop with

distinguishing in our understanding between our own and someone else’s
understanding and practice. It is a theoretically endless process and illustrated in
the above abstract. There is no escape into a real world outside of understanding it as
such
1 might add

herε

that the distinction bεtweεn understanding and practice

does not lead to any kind of dualism, whether between mind and body or between
language and

0비 ects

existing independent of their descrψtlOn.

돼is

is not to say

that the proposition precludes the possibility of someone constructing a dualistic
world and behaving accordingly. Th e proposition merely does not demand such a
world and the recursion need not be infinite.

댔

돼

Th e axiom that we always act in concert with our understanding of the

situation we (conceive to) act in can be extended to human communication as well.
1 take human communication to manifest itself in some observable form of coordination of human behavior, a braiding of individual practices , a dance if you
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wish, that can not do without its participants seeing each other, respecting each
others identities or selves and understanding what they do in concert with and in
expectation of each other, each in their own terms. Le t me be more specific and
propose: Human
communication resides in the unfolding of communication
constructions by and of selves and others inlo intertwined practices.

On thε surface , the proposition seems obvious. 1 wish to point out here that it does
not imply a particular definition of communication (for example, as the transmission
of information, as the control of an effect, or as the maintenance of a relationship).
It merely says where communication resides and proposes a skeleton, a frame or a
grammar into which participants can freely insert their own understanding of it and
of each other. It also does not require that the communication constructions
individuals enact be shared or have

a따thing

in common with each other (like the

notion that communication presupposes agreement on rules, a shared language or a
common symbol repertoire). In fact , such and similar requirements would bring
objectivism right back into the picture and render individual cognition irrelevant or
meaningless in understanding human communication. In contrast to objectivist
accounts, my third proposition symmetricaIly expands the second to others by
suggesting that comlη unicators can not very well position themselves as communicators
in their own communication constructions without acknowledging other communicators
and their respective constructions of each other.
It is the simultaneous unfolding , acting out, testing for the coherences and

subsequent reconstruction of these separate constructions (of how communication is
individuaIly constituted for them) into braided indi띠dual practices that makes
possible for its participants to observe their own involvement as interactive and their
behavior as interdependent. 1 am suggesting that only through such interwoven
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engagements with others can participants come to appreciate the consequences of
communication constructions substantially different from their own.
To make the point in yet another way, 1 obviously do not need to see myself
as communicating with a stone precisely because 1 do not have to consider the
stone’ s understanding of itself, much less of myself, when seeking to understand how
the stone either responds to my kicking it or why it comes in my way through other
causes. Here, causal explanations and the attribution of invariant properties are
perfectly appropriate and an objectivist stance may not unduly harm the object
being observed, compared or described as such (although from an ecological
perceptive, this objectivist position may be questioned, even when it involves
stones). In contrast, what marks much of our interest in understanding other fellow
beings as humans is their cognitive autonomy, their ability to understand in their
very own terms language, themselves, other fellow beings and the circumstances
they see themselves as acting in, an understanding that is inherently creative , invεnts
its own modes of operation and can, at least in principle, be appreciably different
from anyone ’s understanding including mine. Understanding, whether stones or
fellow human beings, always requires one to act out, to test and reexamine one’s
involvement with them. Granting others the same cognitive abilities one claims for
oneselfin understanding them (see

myethi않1

imperative in Krippendorff, 1989:88),

is not the same as assunring that these others think alike, act alike and live in the
same world. Th e assumption of the latter, although often practiced for various
social reasons, would stifle human communication and , when built into scientific
theories, prevents its understanding.
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Four
Note , by saying "everything said is communicated to someone ...," 1 am saying
something about saying something and, by implication, communicating about
communication, which is what human communication theory is to do. Also note
that even though 1 can use quotation marks to distinguish mention and use in
writing, saying something and saying something about saying something takes place
in the same language. Evidently, "saying" is autological or applicable to itself and
comes quite natural to ordinary speakers of a language. Similarly, communication
and communication about communication or meta-communication does not require
meta-meta communication to be entangled (as logical positi띠sts would require , but
anyone’ s recursive understanding of communication. Th e simple fact that
communication theory too must be communicated to someone, understanding it as
such exhibits the self-reference involved in understanding communication.
This is not so in all domains of scientific inquiry. For example, theories in

the natural sciences have nothing to say about the language in which they are cast
and leave the processes through which they are communicated among peers
unproblematized. To most natural scientists, language seems to be transparent (like
water may be for fish). As long as this is so, there can be no phys파 of physics, no
biology of biology. But we certainly can conceive of a sociology of sociology, for
example, and communication about communication makes sense to us as well. This
self-reference makes human communication fundamentally different from the
objects of the natural

scienc앉.

Th e language for comparisons referred to in the first

proposition is part and parcel of the communication processes or theories being
compared. 1 am therefore suggesting that constructions of human
communication theories must be able to constitute themselves
in the veη practices they c1 aim to describe.
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To constitute sornething is to define sornething frorn within what is being
defined. 1 arn clairning this to be so for
anobseπer

thεories

of hurnan cornrnunication. Wh en

understands the intertwined practices of others as processes of

cornrnunication, cornrnunicates a communication theory of their practices to thern
who, influenced by what they hear being said about thern, rnodify their practices
according to their individual understanding of it, which in turn gives rise to new
observations and a rnodified understanding on the part of the observer, then the
process closes in on itsel f. Th e practical consequences of such a theory become the
ground for its (re )forrnulation and the iteration of this process converges to an
eigen-forrn, a fit between each participant’ s understanding of what is being said and
the simultaneous practices they engage in relative to each other. During such
iterations, theories of cornmunication either prove thernselves viable by adjusting
thernselves in the face of perturbations arising frorn their practical embodirnents
(see above abstract) or disappea r. The well known self-fulfilling prophesies
exernplify the kind of convergence that any theory can set in rnotion. It is a process
in which the definience brings forth its own definiendurn.
Five
Now, let rne get cornparisons back into the picture. Elsewhere,

(Krippendorff, 1984) 1 suggested that constructions of cornrnunication bridge the
consequences of at least three kinds of cognitive distinctions. (1) distinctions arnong
the cornrnunicators involved , rninirnally creating one’s own identity relative to
various others, (2) distinctions among the things being said and done or felt whether
these bring forth different messages, speech acts, states of rnind or beliefs associated
with each participant and (3) distinctions in time that allow cornrnunication to be
recognized as an unfolding process. Th ese distinctions probably are grounded in the
most basic constructions of how we can live with each other as hurnans.
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1 believe Dervin’ s idea, that communication means the c1 0sing of a variety of
existing gaps, comes c1 0se to this notion except that 1 cannot see gaps as existing
independentofanyone’ s understanding of them or "gappiness (as) an assumed
’constant’ of the human condition" (1991:62) , but as resulting from someone’s

drawing of and acting on distinctions in which already held constructions of reality,
language and the medium of others ’ participation play important roles. Humans
draw their own distinctions on top of distinctions drawn previously and develop their
own explanatory constructions (inc1uding verbally stated theories) to overcome the
violence these distinctions bring forth in their own understanding. 1 am suggesting
that the unity of drawing distinctions and designing bridges , decomposing and
reconstructing or analyzing and synthesizing always is

dedicatεd

to the preservation

of human understanding and the fact that nobody can be forced to understand
something α5 intended, as it exists or α5 it should be and the fact that noboψ can
directly observe someone else's understanding attests to the cognitive autonomy of the
individuals involved in communication. Understanding, always is anyone ’s own and

human communication can not be anything but voluntary.
Moreover, proposition one suggests that comparisons are made within a
cognitively realized space whose distinctions are continuously drawn and re-drawn
by and in the language being used and should hence be considered a step towards
understanding. Le t me therefore propose:
Th e cognitive operations of re-creating spaces, re-drawing distinctions,
re-constructing, re-examining, comparing and testing the coherences
among (communication) constructions are dedicated
to the preservation of human understanding.

This proposition focuses attention both to the operational nature of human
understanding and its maintaining the coherences among various constructions and
the practices they inform, here in communication with others. To say understanding
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preseπes

itself presumes the possibility of its disturbance, for example, by the

experience of unpredictable consequences, especially from interacting with others,
or from various forms of internal (blind) variations , for example, creative
decomposition and reconstruction processes. It also presumes that understanding
can be reinstated once distrubed. Comparing cognitive constructions is a move in
this direction.
Six

Taking theory to be an observer’s linguistic construction that coheres 、띠th
her own understanding and assuming (with proposition three) that understanding
communication entails the understanding by and of the communicators involved ,
specifically their communication constructions , communication theory becomes an
observer’s explanatory account of the

intertwinεd

practices of participants whose

individual communication theories must be inscribed in it. It does not matter here
whether the inscribed theories are narrated as such by the participants or
reconstructed, based on that observer’ s understanding of the participants'
understanding of their own communication practices. In fewer words, 1 am
suggesting that human communication theory must recuηively inscribe the
coα
mmt

Furthermore, keeping in mind (proposition four) that human communication
theory must be able to constitute itself or prove its viability in the practice it informs
and (proposition five) that comparisons inevitably are involved in processes of
maintaining understanding in human communication, particularly by comparing (the
theorists’ constructions of) the communication constructions participants seemingly
enact, 1 propose:
Comparisons of communication theories call for a process
of conversation among those who practice them.

13

Th is proposition suggests that a methodology for comparing communication

theories follow the same recursive grammar as the communication practices each of
these theories must be able to describe. Ordinary communicators too are engaged
in a continuous testing of coherences, redrawing of various distinctions, reexarnining
the consequences of unfolding their communication constructions. Comparing in
one ’s own understanding the communication constructions (or communication
theories) different participants appear to practice is one of these cognitive
procεsses， εxcεpt

that the issue here no longer is one of establishing commonalties

and differences (which would follow the dictates of objectivist traditions) but one of
exploring within a suitable la맨lage whatd(￦Tent coηstntctions or theories m뺑tdo
to each other when practiced together. To appreciate different constructions of

communication (theories) , to prove their viability in joint practices requires
conversation, dialogue, non-coercive forms of interaction, mutual accommodation,
inviting others into

onε’ s

own constructions of reality while caring for their cog띠tive

autonomy. Th e difference between social scientists and everyday practitioners of
communication may not lie in how they get involved with each other but in different
practices of accounting for their cognitive operations to peers, in different
discourses (methodology versus meta-communication) within which they are 1εd to
maintain different coherences and, 1 would add, in radically pursuing human
understanding, not subrnission.
Seven
With the above propositions in mind, let me finally address Tehranian’s
question "is comparative communication theory possible or desirable?" (1991:44).
Obviously, it always is possible to chose or invent a language that brings forth
commonalties, even among objects from seerningly incommensurate empirical
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domains. (Hickory, communication, Tibet and 1 have not only the letter "i" in
common but also that they all occur in this sentence). Whether particular
comparisons make sense depends on whether a discourse brings the fruits of such
comparisons to someone’ s attention. So, my answer to the first part of the question
is an unequivocalyes.
In proposing to answer the second part of the question, 1 am effectively
adopting its presupposition, that there is no socially neutral theory. Every theory
claims to be about something and engages those understanding it, theoreticians,
practitioners and students alike, in albeit different practices that create, reproduce ,
manipulate , utilize or dirninish the phenomena they see addressed. Only in the
dualist world construction of objectivism is theory neutral, divorced 감ompractice
and independent of anyone’ s understanding it. We know so well that theoretical
advances in atomic physics led to the construction of atom bombs and nuclear
reactors which in turn posed additional theoretical problems and thus set in motion
a process of reconstructing portions of our world. A predictive theory of attitude
change rnight have been born within an acadernic environment but, if it enables
advertisers, political activists or psychologists to mold the attitudes of particular
groups of people, such a theory undoubtedly will give practical support to
instrumental intents and induce the social change it can support. Communication
theories are no exceptions. Th ey inform a variety of communication practices,
whether they come to be embodied in communication technologies, in social
organizations or in the communicative practices of individuals. The desirability of a
comparative methodology depends on which social practices are fostered by the
theories it encourages.
In what follows , 1 will describe one condition in which theory constructions
and comparisons may not need to involve the human understanding by subjects and
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examine some of the social consequences of three failures to not invoke such an
understanding.
(1) 까le scientific observer is concerned with phenomena of human behavior
subjects either (la) are not conscious of, like phenomena outside the range of
human perception, universal constraints or unreflected habits of thought and action,
(lb) may understand but can not vary for effects, like their own biological
constitution, physicallaws or unconditioned reflexes, or, (lc) have no desire or
capability to understand, like knowledge far removed from one ’ s interest or buried
in a language too cumbersome to learn. Indeed , neither of these phenomena can
serve ordinary human communication well. This is not to deny that scientific
discourse and instrumentation, could not give rise to sophisticated communication
technologies, like radiowaves did, or causally effect humane existence, like
techniques of genetic manipulation can. As long as these manifestations are
construed as residing outside the communicators' reach , as unaffected by their
cognition, or as merely physically mediating betweεn thεm， objectivist methods of
comparisons and theory construction might be justifiable in such constructions of

reality. Indeed, the natural sciences have been notorious in creating obscure
technicallanguages that prevent subjects from understanding what this means for
them. Wh ether this practice is ethical in the social domain is another question.
(2) Th e observer either αeates or attends to situations in which subjects find
it desirable or appropriate to suspend their own judgement, render their behavior
reactive to stimuli, perform functions programmed from the outside andjor take no
responsibilities for their own practices. Such situations

arε

typical of controlled

experiments, dεsigned to generate data that are conveniently analyzable in causal or
correlational terms and common also in many industrial settings in which workers
are required to perform albeit cornplex but entirely mechanical or algorithmic tasks.
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Theories created to account for such situations attest to the su비ects’

willingness to comply with given instructions or to apply to themselves the cognitive
constraints their own dεfinition of the situation demands , but say lit t1 e about the
subjects' ability to

concεptualizε，

hypothesize and communicatively construct their

own realities in ways different from what experimenters or controllers of the
situation envision. Among the social consequences of such practices are
reinforcements of a rationality that renders instrumental behavior as a norm , the
preferential development of control theories of human behavior, a conspicuous
absence of theories

of이pec띠cal.ψ

human communication and the virtual silence on

issues of cognitive autonomy. (Paradoxically, the law requires experimenters with
human subjects to obtain their consent which presupposes the subjects to
understand the very controls that prevent them from exercising this abi1ity during
scientific experimentations--just for the convenience of rendering objectivist
comparisons and causal or correlational analyses appropriate).
(3) Th e observer relies on objectivist comparisons and constructs theories
without references to

thε

very processes of human understanding that constitute the

phenomena being observed. 1 am distinguishing here two cases:
(3a) Accounting for communication processes in terms of causal,
correlational or stochastic theories. Since such accounts are not much different
from accounts for the behavior of tri띠 al mechanisms, the metaphorical stone for
εxamplε，

I would argue that theories of this kind also trivialize the communication

practices being expected of subjects in everyday situations. Indeed, theories
concerned with information transrnission, message effects, attitude change and those
relying on metaphors of power and resistance, like the notion of persuasive force,
leave no place for human agency or human cognition in them. Th eories of this kind
are the basis of a behaviorism that declares understanding irrelevant or a mere
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figment of the subjects imagination and has led to the educational implementation
of all kinds of mechanistic concepts of the learner.
(3b) Focussing attention on large systems and highly abstract accounts of
communications , social institutions , communication networks or whole cultures.
Tehranian’ s interest in such systems exemplifies this concern. His comparisons
might seem justified in view of the practical difficulty if not impossibility of
interacting with systems composed of numerous human constituents. However, 1
see two problems with objectivist

cor매 arisons

oflarge and abstract social systems.

(i) Th e omission of references to the human understandings, discoursive practices
and pattεrn of communication that constitute the systems being considered justifies
constructions that have nothing to do with how a system is constituted and

de띠es

the relevance of human involvements. Yet, no culture, no discourse , no human
communication could be observed without its participants continually recognizing,
reproducing, practicing and constituting it as such. (ii) Paying mere lip service to
the importance of cognition and language by assuming them to be invariant and the
same for all constituents of the systems being compared prohibits accounting for
most processes of human communication in them, which are largely set in motion by
cognitive differences. This analytically convenient practice is evident in the
common assumption that the members of a particular culture think alike in most
respects , that the speakers of a language must use the same communication codes
and that the participants of a social system are interchangeable. Th e class and
function concepts in sociology are a typical outgrow of this assumption. 1 would
ar밍le

that social systems always are

constitutεd

by numerous individuals who

continually redraw socially relevant distinctions and reconstruct what the system is
for them , their own idiosyncratic understanding being embedded i，α a networkof
communication practices. In either of the above two omissions, objectivist observers
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becorne 10st in their own conceptua1izations and the ethnocentrisrn Tehranian
sought to avoid becornes b1atant1y evident.
It seerns to rne , by not granting the cornrnunicating hurnans (whose practices
are being obsεrved ， cornpared, exp1ainεd and theorized either individually or as
rnernbers oflarger socia1 systerns) the sarne cognitive abi1ities that scientific
observers rnust clairn for

thernsε1ves

when constructing theories about thern,

researchers assure for themselves the exclusive privilege to determine what is real.
Ar rned with a detached

rnethodo1o망，

understanding becomes the providence of

scientists. And objectifications of the systerns being constructed and cornpared,
cognitively disable its constituents and make it

impossible ψr

them to realize their own

contribution to thern. The theories such cornparisons 1egitirnize rnay be appealing

for their sirnplicity but they a1so serve those interested in domination and control and
support techno1ogica1 and cognitive constructions that enforce a widespread
submission to conditions constructed as rea l.

Finally (4) , 1 arn again suggesting two re1ated cases. (4a) The observer rnay
respect thε subjects' cognitive autonorny but does not engage thern in conversations
concerning the theory proposed about thern. Archeo1ogists, historians and literary
researchers, having to construct their theories frorn surviving fragrnents of past
discoursive practices , naturally are confined to this condition. In contrast,
conversations with individua1 rnernbers of 1iving socia1 systerns cou1d create
attention to what a scientific theory suggests, stirnu1ate objections and elicit
e1aborations conductive to and coherent with their practices of living, both
individually and as rnernbers of 1arger socia1 constructions. In such conversations,
rnernbers also cou1d becorne aware ofwhat they had not noticed before, change
their behavior in response and by irnp1ication require that the theory in question be
reconstructed to reflect the new realities it created. However, failing to engage
subjects in such negotiations and viabi1itating practices keeps the criteria for accepting
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a theory entireψ extemal to the system being compared and privileges a scientific

discourse at the expense o[ the discourse generated withi，η the system. By itself, the
participants' discourse may be equally deficient. Unlike what ethnomethodology
claims, entirely emic theories, using entirely internal validity criteria, rarely are as
insightful about existing practices as when challenged from the outside through
conversation. In theories that constitute themselves in such conversations the
participants' understanding becomes recognized and inscribed. In contrast,
communication theories that emerge out of the received non-participatory
environments are unlikely able to account [or communication as a negotiated
phenomenon. At the very best they reflect the workings of a scientific community.

One can denounce this non-participatory research practice , which is so much
part of positivist research traditions , as arrogant, elitist, observer-centered,
authoritarian, undemocratic or whateve r. It yields communication theories that
those theorised about may never know or have no sαy in if they do. Th eir practical

applications privilege the designers of communication technologies and their users
(e.g. in the role of senders) with instrumental intents by providing them predictions
and instruments o[ control without subjects’ consent.

(4b) Regardless of the form a proposed theory may take, the observer is
interested in generalizations beyond what was either observed or proven viable in
conversation. Generalizations presume commonalties between what was observed
and what these observations are assumed to speak about as well. Generalizations
also leave behind aηything unique , in the case of humans, the contingencies of
embodied experiences , the subjectivity of understanding and above all, all
manifestations o[ cognitive autonomy. To summarily dismiss them may be a rather

heavy human toll to pay. In the first of the four conditions being discussed here , 1
listed several phenomena and generalizations about them might prove less
problematic. Th is is not so in the social domain. Scientific generalizations always
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are public and general theories of human cornmunication, having to be inserted into
and survive the vεry process they describe (see proposition four) both claim and
practice their extendibi1i ty beyond the cornmonalities observed or consented to. 1
am suggesting that by failing to encourage d，ιfsent among those to whom a theory is
claimed applicable, general theories can impose commonalties where they may not or
do not need to exist and prevent individuals αrffected by them from exercising their
cognitive autonomy. Indeed , in the social domain, most generalizations, for example

concerning cultural norms , social class distinctions, cornmon cornmunication codes,
sign-functions , shared conventions , social prejudices or institutional constraints tend
to be constructed as historical facts of sociallife , as super-individual ce.ηainties or as
self-evident standards, not as

comrη unicatively

negotiated cognitive constructions.

Their constructed nature easily is forgotten and the possibility of communicatively
deconstructing them is suppressed.

Generalizations also c1 aim their territories. Wzthout participation and
consent, the more general a theory is claimed to be, particularly by scientists not taking
responsibilities for their own inventions, the larger the territory it covers, the more
’w
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likely is it for individuals to see how their own

constructions could be responsible for it and the more hidden becomes the consequent
suppression. Because of this , general theories about how cornmunication works,--all

of which , 1 would claim, reflect but some theorists' cognitive constructions--not only
validate themselves by forcing subjects’ submissioη but also lay the foundation of an
intellectual imperialism that is all the more diffiω lt to overcome as their disowned
constructions disable reflection.

Finally, back to the question "is a comparative methodology desirable?"
With objectivist methodologies in hand , this depends on which side one is on, the
privileged knower or the generalized and cognitively disabled known. From a
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constructivist perspective, this depends on whether or not those theorized about are
entitled and enabled to shape theories concerning them in conversations and
whether or not the uniqueness of their cognitive autonomy is provided a place in
their construction.
Summary
In the preceding, 1 have argued that human communication is a special kind
of phenomenon, one that brings its own language into the very picture a theory
needs to paint and embeds the comparisons this language enables in its very own
process. This led me to conc1ude that comparisons of human communication
theories that do justice to the communication processes they c1 aim to describe must
take place and prove their viability in conversations or dialogues that honor the
cognitive autonomy of their participants and offer each the opportunity to contribute to
the construction of such theories, at least by visibly practicing their own understanding
ofthem.
Whenevεr

theories are

comparεd

and constructed to explain phenomena that

also lie in the domain of human understanding for those of whom they c1 aim to
speak, ethical considerations become inevitable. This is true for most social
theories but especially for theories of human communication which can bring forth
and sustain processes most central to individual self-understanding and the
construction of society constitutionally involving them. My proposal has been to
distribute the ethical responsibilities such theories entail by engaging those involved in

conversations that could comparatively (re)construct them in the practice they
inform. Abstract and general theories accepted without advice and consent from those
involved as informants or constituer따 of the system of their concem, can become
oppressive and support an intellectual imperialism that prevents individuals from
realizing their own and most precious cognitive autonomy.
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